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In recent years, the Supreme Court has upheld contractual pro-visions that require mandatory, binding arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims.1  In the wake of these decisions,
many legal academics have condemned this practice, arguing that
the mandatory arbitration of discrimination disputes violates
public policy and possibly even due process.2  These critics assert
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1 See  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-30 (1991).  This Article considers arbitra-
tion provisions that employees must sign as a condition of employment.  Although
“mandatory” is perhaps a misnomer, I follow the literature and refer to these predis-
pute arbitration agreements as mandatory.
2 See, e.g ., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law , 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1967 (1996); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Con-
tracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law , 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766
(2002); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration , 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 643 (1996) [here-
inafter Sternlight, Panacea]; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury
Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns , 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Constitutionality]; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the
1990s , 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1049 (1996); Christine M. Reilly, Comment,
Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment , 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1224
(2002); see also  Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employ-
ees , 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 454 (1996); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the
Goals of Employment Discrimination Law , 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 439
[861]
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that arbitration strips the employee of important procedural pro-
tections and, in doing so, benefits the employer at the employee’s
expense.3  On the other hand, advocates of mandatory arbitra-
tion argue that mandatory arbitration can make both the em-
ployer and the employee better off.4
What has not been stressed in this debate is how mandatory
arbitration allows employers to manage risk.  Employers claim
that mandatory arbitration—because it can eliminate the jury
trial, class actions, and large attorney’s fees—allows them to
avoid the “risk” associated with litigating an employment dis-
crimination dispute.5
The filing of a discrimination claim depends on factors that the
employer cannot perfectly predict or control, such as the actions
of the employer’s agents and the employee’s proclivity to file
suit.  Through mandatory arbitration, the employer limits its ex-
posure if there is discrimination or the perception of discrimina-
tion in the workplace.  Put another way, mandatory arbitration
(1999); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration , 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33, 38, 110-15 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial , 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 669, 669-72 (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight, Jury Trial].
The debate over mandatory arbitration extends beyond academia. See  Russell D.
Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due? , 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281,
292 (2002) (describing recent legislative proposals designed to curtail the use of
mandatory arbitration in employment contracts).
3 See, e.g. , Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 59-67.
4 See  Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Eco-
nomic Analysis , 8 S. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 225 (2000).  For other scholars offering a
sympathetic view of mandatory arbitration, see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair”
Arbitration Clauses , 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (2001); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims , 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344
(1997); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements , 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
559 (2001) [hereinafter Estreicher, Rickshaws]; Michael Z. Green, Debunking the
Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination
Claims , 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (2000); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights , 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 62 (1998); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmiti-
gated Evil or Blessing in Disguise? , 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1998); see generally
Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome? , 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998).
5 See  Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 63; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and
the Consumerization of Arbitration , 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997); see also  Francis J.
Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims , 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (“For many employers, managing this risk of liability is a vital
part of their human resources mission and an important part of their general corpo-
rate cost-control program.”).
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functions as a risk-management device for the employer.  To
date, scholars have largely ignored this role played by mandatory
arbitration.6  By linking the uncertainty of discrimination claims
and the risk-management function of mandatory arbitration, this
Article offers insights into two puzzles unanswered in the litera-
ture and heated policy debate over these provisions.
First, some employers do not use mandatory arbitration.7  If, as
the critics argue, mandatory arbitration benefits the employer at
the expense of the employee, why doesn’t every employment
contract include an arbitration provision?
Second, employers in discrimination cases prevail more on
summary judgment than any other kind of defendant.  The puz-
zle is why employers do so well in the litigation of employment
discrimination disputes.8  The leading explanation is judicial bias
against discrimination plaintiffs.  Judges, the theory goes, do not
like plaintiffs who bring discrimination claims; accordingly, they
abuse the summary judgment standard to get rid of the claims.
When tackling these two puzzles from the risk-management
premise, the question becomes whether mandatory arbitration
adequately accounts for the problems of asymmetric information
inherent to any risk-management scheme.9  To see this point,
consider another, albeit different, way to manage risk: insurance.
6 In passing, a few commentators have noted the risk-reducing role of arbitration.
See  Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes
Employment Contracts , 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 119, 122 (2002);
Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 63; Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Economic Analysis , 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1995); Marcela Noemi Siderman, Com-
ment, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving: Reforming Arbitration to
Accommodate Title VII Protections , 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885, 1914-15 (2000).  None
of these commentators fully consider the implications of viewing arbitration as a
risk-management device.  Instead, they suggest that employers prefer mandatory ar-
bitration for other reasons, including: (1) reduced litigation costs; (2) faster dispute
resolution; (3) less publicity if the employee prevails; (4) the lack of a published
opinion; (5) the benefits that the employer reaps because it is a “repeat player” at
arbitration; (6) the ability to preclude class actions; and (7) the ability to avoid dis-
pute resolution by imposing all or part of the arbitration fees on the employee. See,
e.g. , Sternlight, Jury Trial , supra  note 3, at 681-87; Schwartz, supra  note 3, at 59-62. R
7 See infra  note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the number of employers R
that use mandatory arbitration).
8 For the data on discrimination case outcomes, see the discussion of Stewart
Schwab’s work, infra  note 104.
9 Asymmetric information refers to “situations where one economic agent knows
something that another economic agent doesn’t.” HAL R. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 1992).  Economists have coined the two
problems of asymmetric information as “moral hazard” and “adverse selection.”
See infra  notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing both concepts). R
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In every insurance market, the insurer tries to target the cost of
the insurance to the risk the insured presents.  If, however, be-
cause of asymmetric information, the cost of the insurance fails
to reflect an individual’s specific risk level, the market will have a
tendency to unravel, with only the high-risk individuals remain-
ing in the insurance pool.
Today, the mandatory arbitration system does not account for
employer-specific risk.  Because of this fact, this Article predicts
that the market will have a tendency to separate.  The employers
that gain the most from arbitration (the discrimination-prone or
high-risk employers) will use mandatory arbitration.  On the
other hand, low-risk employers, because they do not want to pay
the price implicit in mandatory arbitration (since it does not re-
flect their specific risk level), will forgo the risk-averting benefits
of arbitration and take their chances with litigation.  High-risk
employers arbitrate; low-risk employers litigate.10  The discrimi-
nation case outcomes, then, do not reveal judicial bias or an
abuse of the summary judgment standard.  Instead, the case out-
comes reflect the merits of the underlying pool of discrimination
claims being litigated.11
More important, the self-selection of high-risk employers out
of litigation is potentially problematic for the development of
discrimination case law.  With self-selection, the case law is based
on an unrepresentative sample of employers (the low-risk em-
ployers only).  As a result, the doctrine might skew in favor of
employers, despite continued and unchanging discriminatory
conduct across a broader array of employers.
In addition to this separation idea, a risk-based analysis of
mandatory arbitration offers three further insights and a reform
proposal.  First, under this analysis, employers that are frequently
called into arbitration should do progressively worse over time.
This result stands in stark contrast to the conventional view re-
10 In discussing the empirical evidence about mandatory arbitration, Steve Ware
recognized that the cases going to litigation might systematically differ from cases
going to arbitration. See  Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and
Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration , 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 735, 757 (2001).  This Article provides a theoretical justification for a partic-
ular type of employer self-selecting into arbitration.  As explained infra  notes 110-11 R
and accompanying text, the market segmentation result does not hinge on the em-
ployer paying a higher wage to employees who agree to mandatory arbitration.
11 The theory offers a testable and counterintuitive rationale for the discrimina-
tion case outcomes.  The model predicts that employers that have a history of dis-
crimination claims should be more inclined to use mandatory arbitration.
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garding the so-called “repeat player” effect: the idea that arbitra-
tors are inherently biased in favor of parties that frequently
engage in arbitration.12  Viewed in terms of risk management, the
repeat player (or, more precisely, the repeat discriminator13)
should actually pay more to use mandatory arbitration because it
poses, statistically speaking, a greater threat of discrimination.
The reason is that a long history of discrimination claims reveals
information about the propensity to discriminate of that em-
ployer’s agents.
Here, a rough analogy to the automobile insurance market is
illustrative.  The driver involved in six accidents in the same year
pays more for insurance than the accident-free driver.  Likewise,
the employer that faces six discrimination suits in the same year
should have to pay more than the employer that faces one dis-
crimination suit per year for the risk-management benefits
mandatory arbitration offers.  Yet, the available empirical evi-
dence reveals the existence of a repeat-player advantage, not a
repeat-player disadvantage.14  To combat this problem, this Arti-
cle proposes that arbitrators consider the employer’s discrimina-
tion history when fashioning the arbitration award.15
12 See  Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards , 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 223, 223-24 (1998) (describing the advantages that repeat players have in arbi-
tration); Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Move-
ment to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution , 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 934
(2002) (same); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alter-
native Judicial Systems?:  Repeat Players in ADR , 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
19, 20 (1999) (same). See generally  Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change , 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 149
(1974) (arguing that the “legal system tends to confer interlocking advantages on
overlapping groups [i.e., the repeat players]”).  The argument underlying the “repeat
player” contention usually assumes one of two forms.  First, arbitrators will have a
tendency to favor frequent players in arbitration in order to ensure repeat business.
Second, by frequently engaging in arbitration, a repeat player gains expertise at the
arbitration “game,” enabling it to better use the system.
13 In this Article, the phrase “repeat discriminator” refers to companies against
whom multiple discrimination claims have been filed, independent of the claims’
merit.  The idea of the repeat discriminator has nothing to do with discrimination
broadly defined.  It is a claim-based concept.
14 See  Bingham, supra  note 12, at 238 (“Among employee claims against employ-
ers, repeat player employers do better in employment arbitration than non-repeat
player employers.”); see also  Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect , 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) (same).
15 Under our current system, past acts of discrimination are not explicitly consid-
ered at arbitration.  Like a judicial proceeding, the arbitration hearing focuses on the
facts of the case at hand.
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Second, a risk-management approach lends some needed pre-
cision to the unconscionability analysis of mandatory arbitration
provisions.  In analyzing arbitration provisions for unconsciona-
bility, courts focus on several factors, including the relative bar-
gaining power of the two parties, whether the arbitration
agreement is substantially one-sided, and the number of rights
afforded to the employee in arbitration.16  A risk-based analysis
can help screen valid arbitration provisions from invalid provi-
sions by informing the meaning of “one-sided.”
Finally, this new perspective clarifies why mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements are different in kind from postdispute agree-
ments to arbitrate.  In a workplace governed by mandatory
arbitration, the employer has a diminished incentive to closely
monitor and select its employees because it knows that arbitra-
tion, not litigation, will be used to resolve disputes.17  Postdispute
arbitration agreements do not raise the same incentive
concerns.18
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I summarizes the le-
gal landscape.  It discusses the case law establishing the validity
of contracts that require the arbitration of discrimination claims
as a condition of employment.  Part II sets forth the conventional
wisdom about mandatory arbitration, detailing the arguments
commonly made by critics and proponents of mandatory arbitra-
tion.  The bulk of the Article, Part III, challenges the conven-
tional wisdom and explores the implications of the risk-based
analysis.  Part III starts by developing the basic asymmetric infor-
mation framework.  It then discusses how this framework sheds
light on (1) the role arbitration plays in maintaining incentives to
avoid discrimination; (2) the repeat player effect; (3) market seg-
mentation; (4) the adequacy requirement for arbitral forums; (5)
the unconscionability doctrine; and (6) the difference between
predispute and postdispute agreements.  Part IV considers the
16 See, e.g. , Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (2002); Ferguson
v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (2002). But see  Cole v. Burns Int’l
Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (1997) (holding, without mentioning unconscionabil-
ity, that “statutory rights [i.e., Title VII] include both a substantive protection and
access to a neutral forum”).
17 As discussed infra  notes 77-78 and accompanying text, mandatory arbitration in R
an adequate arbitral forum mitigates this incentive problem.
18 My discussion of incentive effects is limited to the employment context.  Steven
Shavell makes a compelling argument that, in many situations, predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate create beneficial incentive effects.  Shavell, supra  note 6, at 5.
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relationship between mandatory arbitration and other risk-man-
agement mechanisms, in particular, liability insurance.
I
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND GILMER
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).19
The FAA’s purpose “was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts.”20  To accomplish this goal, the substantive portion of the
FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.21
Procedurally, the FAA grants district courts the authority to
(1) stay a judicial proceeding if that proceeding involves an issue
that is potentially subject to arbitration22 and/or (2) compel arbi-
tration “when one party has failed, neglected, or refused to com-
ply with an arbitration agreement.”23  According to the Supreme
Court, these substantive and procedural provisions evidence a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”24
The Supreme Court first applied the policy favoring arbitration
to discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.25 In Gilmer , the plaintiff, Robert Gilmer, alleged that his
employer had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) when it terminated his employment.  As a condi-
tion of his employment, Gilmer registered with several stock ex-
19 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  The Act was originally
known as the U.S. Arbitration Act.  In 1947, Congress codified the Act as Title 9.  In
this codification, Congress deleted the section of the statute naming it the U.S Arbi-
tration Act.  Since then, the Act has been commonly referred to as the Federal Arbi-
tration Act. See Sternlight, Panacea , supra note 2, at n.12.
20 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
21 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (2000).
22 Id . § 4.
23 Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 25.
24 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
25 500 U.S. at 20.
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changes.26  The registration application contained a boilerplate
clause requiring Gilmer to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy between
a registered representative [i.e., Gilmer] and any member or
member organization [i.e., Interstate] arising out of the employ-
ment or termination of employment of such registered represen-
tative.”27  The issue in Gilmer  was whether an ADEA claim
could be subject to mandatory arbitration.28
In a seven-to-two decision, the Court held that Gilmer’s
ADEA claim was arbitrable.29  Reasoning from precedent that
allowed for the arbitration of other statutory claims, the Court
declared that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judi-
cial, forum.”30  The Court further opined that “[h]aving made the
bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Con-
gress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judi-
cial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”31  Finding nothing
in the ADEA’s text or legislative history indicating an intent to
preclude arbitration, the Court rejected the argument that
mandatory arbitration was inconsistent with the purpose of the
ADEA.32
Although Gilmer  upheld the mandatory arbitration of a dis-
crimination claim, the Court did not preclude every type of chal-
lenge to these provisions.33  After Gilmer , a plaintiff could still
seek revocation of a mandatory arbitration agreement on gener-
26 Id . at 23.
27 Id .
28 Id .
29 Id .
30 Id . at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
31 Id.  (quoting Mitsubishi , 473 U.S. at 628).
32 Id.  at 27.
33 Gilmer  left open a number of issues that the Court has since resolved.
First, section 1 of the FAA contains an exclusionary clause, providing that “noth-
ing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce.”  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  According to the majority,
this clause did not apply in Gilmer  because the arbitration clause was not in a “con-
tract for employment,” but rather in a registration application with the securities
exchanges. Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.  Thus, the Gilmer  Court did not address the
textual argument that the plain meaning of the exclusionary clause meant that the
FAA did not apply to employment contracts.  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams ,
the Court tackled this argument and construed the exclusionary clause to apply to
employment contracts with “transportation workers” only.  532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
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ally applicable contract law grounds, such as duress, unconscio-
nability, or fraud.34  For simplicity, I refer to this exception as the
“contract-based” exception to enforceability.  In addition, a
plaintiff could still challenge the adequacy of a particular arbitra-
tion proceeding.35  This exception will be referred to as the “ade-
quacy-based” exception to enforceability.
Since Gilmer , the debate over mandatory arbitration provi-
sions has centered on these two exceptions.  Nonetheless, be-
cause the Supreme Court has left these two exceptions
undefined, lower courts have struggled to distinguish between
valid and invalid arbitration agreements.36
More important for my purposes, the language of Gilmer  re-
flects an unstated premise.  The Court views arbitration as a
Restated, the Court held that the FAA was applicable to all employment contracts,
except those for “transportation workers.”
Second, Gilmer  did not resolve the issue of preemption.  Was a state law targeting
mandatory arbitration provisions for special treatment inconsistent with the FAA
and hence preempted?  In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto , the Court an-
swered this question affirmatively.  The Court held that “Montana’s first-page notice
requirement, which governs not ‘any contract,’ but specifically and solely contracts
‘subject to arbitration,’ conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the
federal measure.”  517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996); see also  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
Third, Gilmer  did not resolve the issue of arbitration fees.  Under the NYSE rules
at issue in Gilmer , “it was the standard practice for securities industry parties, arbi-
trating employment disputes, to pay all of the arbitrators’ fees.”  Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 94 (2000) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  Accord-
ingly, the Court did not consider whether the allocation of fees affected the enforce-
ability of a mandatory arbitration agreement.  There is, however, a concern about
the fee structure of these agreements.  A party might, for instance, foreclose access
to the arbitral forum (and therefore any  forum) by requiring the opposing party to
pay all the fees associated with arbitration.  In Green Tree , the Supreme Court
placed the burden of showing the likelihood of “prohibitively expensive” arbitration
fees on the party seeking to invalidate the arbitration agreement.  531 U.S. at 92.
34 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 33.
35 Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1999); accord
Murray v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th
Cir. 2002) (“And, of course, agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims, such as
those pursued under Title VII, may be revoked if the prospective litigant demon-
strates that it cannot ‘effectively . . . vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum.’”) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. , 531 U.S. at 89); Cole v.
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs. Int’l, 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that “stat-
utory rights include both a substantive protection and  access to a neutral forum in
which to enforce those protections”).  Note, too, that the adequacy exception only
applies to the arbitration of federal statutory claims.
36 As this Article will demonstrate, a risk-based analysis informs both these excep-
tions. See infra  Part III.E.
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“contracted-for” substitute for litigation.37  To reiterate, the
Court will uphold a mandatory arbitration provision “[s]o long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] stat-
utory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”38  By speaking in
terms of vindication, the Court focuses on whether the arbitra-
tion procedure at issue is a “good enough” substitute for litiga-
tion.39  If, however, risk-management is one purpose of
mandatory arbitration, a comparison to litigation is incomplete.
In employment cases, the court should also ask whether the arbi-
tration procedure is a “good enough” substitute for other risk-
management devices—such as, say, liability insurance.  Before
exploring the implications of this benchmark change, I first re-
view and criticize the conventional wisdom regarding mandatory
arbitration.
II
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
A. The Critics
The conventional wisdom espoused by critics of mandatory ar-
bitration starts from consent.  First, critics note that mandatory
arbitration provisions are often buried in the fine print of con-
tracts of adhesion.40  As a result, employees are unlikely to read,
37 The Court has expressed this view of arbitration in a number of cases besides
Gilmer . See  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987)
(stating that “[t]he decision in Scherk  thus turned on the Court’s judgment that
under the circumstances of that case, arbitration was an adequate substitute for ad-
judication as a means of enforcing the parties’ statutory rights”); Gateway Coal Co.
v. United Mineworkers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 378 (1974) (noting that “commercial
arbitration and labor arbitration have different objectives. In the former case, arbi-
tration takes the place of litigation, while in the latter ‘arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife’“) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); see also  Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille,
When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution?  The Ever
Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration , 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 149
(2002) (“The Court has consistently viewed arbitration as a cost-saving alternative to
litigation.”).  Most commentators share this view of arbitration. See, e.g.,  Moohr,
supra  note 2, at 402 (“Arbitration is . . . a substitute, or alternative, for formal,
public adjudication.”).
38 Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
39 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc ., 482 U.S. at 229.
40 An adhesion contract is:
(1) a standardized (typed or printed) form document (2) drafted by, or on
behalf of, one party which (3) participates routinely in numerous like trans-
actions and (4) presents the form to the other, ‘adhering’ party on a take-it-
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understand, or fully appreciate the consequences of agreeing to
an arbitral forum.41  The employer—preying on the employee’s
lack of knowledge—will have a tendency to draft an arbitration
provision that disproportionately favors its interests.42  In the
end, the employee’s choice is between a job in which employ-
ment discrimination disputes are arbitrated and no job whatso-
ever.43  Such a choice is really no choice at all.
A second level of the conventional criticism can be roughly
categorized into four process-based arguments.  First, critics
stress that mandatory arbitration often reduces the value of the
employee’s claim by limiting the scope of available relief, deny-
ing class actions, and restricting discovery.44  Second, critics ar-
gue that the lack of a written opinion in arbitration impedes the
scope of judicial review, which is already limited under the
FAA.45  Third, critics point out that arbitration inhibits the crea-
tion of precedent by diverting cases from litigation into arbitra-
tion.46  Finally, critics worry about the privacy of arbitration
proceedings, declaring that litigation is beneficial precisely be-
cause of its public nature.47  Under this view, litigation informs
the public about the undesirable characteristics of the “wrongdo-
ing” employer and draws a line between permissible and imper-
missible employment practices.48
Finally, a third level of criticism is constitutional.  Scholars
have suggested that mandatory arbitration may violate the Due
or-leave-it basis; (5) the adhering party enters into few transactions of the
type in question, and (6) the adhering party signs the form after dickering
over the few terms, if any, that are open to bargaining.
Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 55.
41 Sternlight, Panacea , supra  note 2, at 676.
42 Id . at 680-82; Cole, supra  note 2, at 475-76.
43 Reilly, supra  note 2, at 1258 (“Giving up one’s right to a judicial forum versus
giving up one’s job is hardly a voluntary choice, particularly when such clauses have
become boilerplate language in employment contracts. Such a ‘choice’ is naturally
coercive and therefore involuntary.”); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A
Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice , 47 UCLA
L. REV. 949, 1026 (2000).
44 Sternlight, Panacea , supra  note 2, at 638.
45 Speidel, supra  note 4, at 1090 (suggesting that the FAA be amended to require
a written award to “insure that the actual implementation of [statutory] rights in
arbitration approximates the remedies that the individual would otherwise get in
court”).
46 Sternlight, Panacea , supra  note 2, at 686; Moohr, supra  note 2, at 432, 436.
47 Moohr, supra  note 2, at 436-38.
48 Id . at 437.
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Process Clause or the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.49
Though not fitting neatly into any criticisms listed thus far, David
Schwartz has also argued that adhesive mandatory arbitration
provisions represent impermissible prospective waivers of statu-
tory rights.50
B. The Proponents
Not surprisingly, the conventional wisdom offered by propo-
nents of mandatory arbitration starts from freedom of contract.
Proponents argue that employees and employers will only agree
to mandatory arbitration if the agreement makes them both bet-
ter off.51  If the total expected cost of litigation is greater than the
total expected cost of arbitration, a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment creates a surplus.52  The parties can then share this surplus
to ensure that both parties are better off arbitrating instead of
litigating.53  In other words, even assuming that the employee is
generally worse off in arbitration, if arbitration makes the em-
ployer sufficiently better off, the employer can simply pay the
employee enough to make her indifferent between arbitration
and litigation.  This Coasian analysis lies at the heart of the pro-
ponent’s argument that mandatory arbitration is efficient and so-
cially desirable.54
In a different vein, Samuel Estreicher advocates mandatory ar-
49 Sternlight, Constitutionality , supra  note 2, at 69-77, 80-98.
50 Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 110-25.
51 Hylton, supra  note 4, at 224-25; Drahozal, supra  note 4, at 744-46.  Strictly
speaking, Drahozal should be not classified as a “proponent” of mandatory arbitra-
tion.  In the Illinois piece, Drahozal demonstrates that whether arbitration clauses
are efficient depends on the underlying market structure.  Drahozal, supra  note 4, at
764 (“If the market is ineffective, arbitration not only may not benefit individuals, it
actually may make the parties worse off; the corporation’s gain may be more than
offset by the individual’s loss.”).
52 Hylton, supra  note 4, at 225-26; Drahozal, supra  note 4, at 746.
53 Hylton, supra  note 4, at 223; Drahozal, supra  note 4, at 745-46.
54 Hylton, supra  note 4, at 222; see also  Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost , 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  To illustrate, suppose that it costs each party $25 to
arbitrate and $50 to litigate.  Further suppose that, with a mandatory arbitration
agreement in place, the employer’s agent discriminates for sure, causing $60 worth
of damage.  Assume that the arbitrator favors the employer.  Accordingly, the arbi-
trator only awards $30 worth of damages to the employee.  In contrast, if the em-
ployer discriminates and the case is litigated, the employer pays the full $60 in
damages. Under these conditions, mandatory arbitration is efficient—it saves $50 of
dispute resolution costs while imposing $30 in additional damages.  As a result, if the
employer paid the employee $30 or more to agree to mandatory arbitration, both
the employer and the employee would be better off arbitrating instead of litigating.
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bitration on pragmatic grounds.  Estreicher recognizes that the
stakes of most discrimination claims are too small to attract the
attention of attorneys.55  The plaintiffs’ bar, therefore, can be se-
lective among claimants, only taking on those cases with a large
settlement value.56  In Estreicher’s opinion, the average claimant
does not get much of anything through litigation.57  The benefi-
ciaries of the litigation model of dispute resolution are high-sala-
ried claimants and plaintiff’s attorneys.  In contrast to litigation,
Estreicher asserts that the average claimant benefits from arbi-
tration.  In his view, arbitration offers a lower-cost forum, result-
ing in a lower cost of representation.58  As a consequence, the
average claimant is able to find an attorney to take her case to
arbitration.  Moreover, Estreicher maintains that the prompt res-
olution of claims in arbitration is “more suitable for claims by
incumbent employees or even former employees truly desiring
reinstatement.”59
In the conventional debate, commentators on both sides miss
the chief benefit of mandatory arbitration—managing risk.
Commentators have a simple discrimination story in mind—the
employer discriminates and the employee sues.  This story ne-
glects the randomness of most discrimination claims and, hence,
the interaction of risk and mandatory arbitration.  Two factors
contribute to the uncertainty of discrimination claims.
First, before hiring, the employer cannot assess the applicant’s
proclivity to file suit.  The applicant’s decision to file turns on a
host of factors, many of which the employer is unable to predict.
These factors—which vary from applicant to applicant—include:
(1) the applicant’s perceptions about what constitutes discrimina-
tion; (2) the applicant’s willingness to subject herself to dispute
resolution; (3) the applicant’s ability to read, understand, and en-
force her rights; and (4) the applicant’s ability to retain an
attorney.60
55 Estreicher, Rickshaws , supra  note 4, at 563.  Theodore St. Antoine has made
the same pragmatic argument.  St. Antoine, supra  note 4, at 6-8. See also  David
Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Sav-
ing the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Pro-
cess , 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999).
56 Estreicher, Rickshaws , supra  note 4, at 564.
57 Id .
58 Id .
59 Id .
60 See  John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation , 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 993 (1991) (“To raise a bona
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Second, after hiring, the employer does not have complete
control over the activities of its employees.61  The divergence be-
tween the interests and preferences of many of the employees
and the interests of the employer, combined with imperfect mon-
itoring, means that employers cannot eliminate the chance of ac-
tual discrimination or the perception of discrimination in the
workplace.
The existence of a robust liability insurance market for dis-
crimination claims provides further evidence of the uncertain na-
ture of these claims.62  Insurance markets work because insurers
diversify away the risk of uncertain events.  In the insurance mar-
ket for discrimination claims, insurers bet that some employers
will face claims and others will not.  Neither insurers nor employ-
ers can predict perfectly which employers will be subject to a
claim.63
With this uncertainty in mind, the bulk of the next section con-
siders how mandatory arbitration enables employers to manage
risk.
III
USING MANDATORY ARBITRATION TO
MANAGE RISK
Before turning to the risk-based analysis of mandatory arbitra-
tion, a brief description of an insurance model helps to frame the
discussion.  The model is used to highlight problems of asymmet-
ric information.  These problems arise under three conditions: (1)
one party agrees to bear a risk, (2) the probability that the risk
will materialize depends on another party’s actions or latent
characteristics, and (3) information asymmetries make it hard to
contract on these actions or latent characteristics.64  With insur-
fide claim of employment discrimination, a worker must first perceive that discrimi-
nation has occurred.  Clearly, the ability to detect violations of one’s rights—and,
once detected, to categorize such violations as legally actionable—depends not only
on the grossness of the violation but also on one’s education, legal sophistication,
and general perceptions of one’s rights.”).
61 Note, too, that neither the applicant nor the employer can perfectly predict the
actions of the other employees of the business.  This makes the possibility of dis-
crimination and the filing of a claim an uncertain event in the eyes of the employer
and  the applicant.
62 See  L. Kathleen Chaney, Employment Practices Liability Insurance , COLO.
LAW., July 2001, at 125 (describing the rapid expansion of this insurance market).
63 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (6th ed. 2003).
64 Information asymmetries make the party’s actions or latent characteristics ei-
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ance, for example, the insured pays a premium and transfers the
risk of the insured-against event to the insurer.  The insured’s ac-
tions and latent characteristics influence the chance that the in-
sured-against event will take place.  And, finally, it is sometimes
hard to write a contract whose payment is contingent on the in-
sured’s actions and latent characteristics.  I discuss these condi-
tions in more depth below.
In the case of mandatory arbitration, a similar transaction
takes place.  Through mandatory arbitration, the employer trans-
fers to the employee some of the risk of discriminatory conduct
in the workplace.  The employer’s actions and characteristics in-
fluence whether or not there is discrimination in the workplace.
That is, the employer’s monitoring, training, and selecting its
workforce impacts whether an employee suffers discrimination
or perceives she has suffered discrimination.  Last, most
mandatory arbitration provisions do not account for actions
taken by an employer to avoid discrimination claims.
The notion that the employee bears the risk of discrimination
is counterintuitive.  As between the employee and the employer,
the thinking is that the employee is more risk averse; as a result,
any risk should be borne by the employer.  We often observe,
however, employees explicitly agreeing to take on risk created in
the workplace.  In the case of dangerous occupations, for exam-
ple, the employee agrees to an increased risk of bodily injury in
return for higher wages.  The attributes of the workplace create
the dangerous occupation.  Yet the employee, not the employer,
bears any risk above the level covered by worker’s compensa-
tion.  And this is true despite the fact that the employee is
thought to be more risk averse than the employer.  The same ar-
gument applies to mandatory arbitration.
A. Illustrating the Problems of Asymmetric Information: The
Case of Insurance
Begin by assuming there is a single agent.  Further, assume
that there are two states of nature: bad and good.  In the bad
state, the agent’s house burns down and she suffers a loss equal
ther unobservable or unverifiable to the court or other third-party enforcer.  The
parties, then, cannot write an enforceable contract that is contingent on those ac-
tions or characteristics.  This is what creates the problem. See  discussion of asym-
metric information and insurance, infra notes 66-73.  For the rest of the discussion I R
do not distinguish between actions and characteristics that are “unobservable” and
those that are “unverifiable.”
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to $1,000.  In the good state, there is no fire; consequently, the
agent suffers no loss.  If the agent is risk averse, she is willing to
pay a premium greater than her expected loss (i.e., the
probability of the fire multiplied by the loss) in the bad state to
equalize her wealth across the good and bad states.  In other
words, she will fully insure.65  In this stylized example, the agent’s
actions did not influence whether or not the fire took place.
Now consider the case in which the agent can engage in some
risk-reducing activity (e.g., not smoking in bed) that alters the
probability that the good state will occur.66  If the insurer can
observe and verify to the court the agent’s actions, this additional
wrinkle poses no problem.  The insurer can make the payment on
the insurance contract contingent on the agent’s engaging in the
risk-reducing activity.67  The agent, in effect, gets complete insur-
ance coverage if and only if she engages in the “right” amount of
risk-reducing activities.
If the agent’s actions are unobservable—that is, the insurer is
unable to determine whether the agent is engaging in risk-reduc-
ing activities—the insurance contract becomes more compli-
cated.  Because the actions are unobservable, the optimal
contract no longer provides full insurance.  Instead, the optimal
contract imposes some risk on the agent to induce her to under-
take risk-reducing activities.  If the fire occurs, for example, the
agent might have to pay a fraction of the total loss, forcing the
agent to internalize partially the cost of not engaging in risk-re-
ducing activities.68  Under this contract, the risk-averse agent still
reaps some of the benefits of insurance—she does not suffer the
entire loss from the fire.  Nonetheless, the fractional payment,
whether in the form of a deductible or a co-insurance payment,
gives the agent an incentive to engage in risk-reducing activities.
This contract illustrates the fundamental tradeoff between risk
and incentive.  To give the agent the proper incentives, the con-
tract makes sure that she bears some of the loss if the bad state
65 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROEONOMIC THEORY 187-88 (1995).
66 For a model of this sort, see VARIAN, supra  note 10, at 455-57.  The proposi- R
tions outlined above come directly from the principal-agent literature.  In this con-
text, the principal is the insurer and the agent is the insured.
67 For this result in a general principal-agent model, see Bengt Holmstro¨m, Moral
Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. OF ECON. 74, 76 (1979).
68 See id . at 80 (“Optimal accident insurance policies necessarily entail deductibles
in the presence of moral hazard.”).
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occurs.69  The more the agent’s actions influence the probability
that the bad state will occur, the greater the need to give the
agent an incentive to engage in risk-reducing activities.  Accord-
ingly, economists have demonstrated that the amount of risk im-
posed under the optimal contract depends, in part, on the degree
to which the agent’s actions affect the probability of the uncer-
tain outcome.70
In addition to the agent’s actions, the agent’s latent character-
istics may also influence the chance that the bad state will occur.
With health insurance, for example, an agent might be particu-
larly susceptible to illness.  She would therefore represent a
higher risk than others in the health insurance pool.  In and of
itself, different susceptibility to injury does not present a problem
for the insurer.  If the agent’s characteristics are observable and
verifiable, the insurer can simply set the premium to reflect the
agent’s specific risk.  For example, the chronically ill person pays
more for health insurance than the person who never gets sick.
Here again, a problem arises when there is asymmetric infor-
mation between the insurer and the agent.  Suppose that the in-
surance pool consists of high-risk and low-risk applicants and the
insurer cannot tell the difference between the two types of appli-
cants.71  Under these conditions, the insurer will set the premium
to reflect the average risk of the potential members of the pool.
As a result, the low-risk applicant will pay too much for the in-
surance and the high-risk applicant will pay too little.  Accord-
ingly, some low-risk applicants will have an incentive to opt out
of the insurance scheme altogether, resulting in a higher propor-
tion of high-risk applicants in the insurance pool.  This shift in
composition will cause the premium to rise, inducing the exit of
even more low-risk applicants.  Eventually the market will have a
69 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra  note 66, at 483 (“[I]ncentives for high effort can be R
provided only at the cost of having the manager face risk.”).
70 To be precise, the degree to which the optimal contract deviates from full insur-
ance is based on two factors: (1) how much the agent’s actions influence the
probability of the uncertain outcomes, and (2) the extent of the agent’s risk aversion.
As the first factor increases, the benefit to imposing risk on the agent increases.
Imposing risk, however, is costly for the risk-averse agent.  The second factor mea-
sures the extent of this cost.  The optimal deviation from full insurance considers
both the costs and benefits of imposing risk on the agent.  Holmstro¨m, supra  note
68, at 79. R
71 I restrict attention to two types of applicants for the purpose of explaining ad-
verse selection.  For a model with many types distributed along some interval, see
MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra  note 66, at 437-43. R
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tendency to unravel, leaving only high-risk applicants in the pool.
Because of asymmetric information, the insurer cannot match the
premium to the individual’s specific risk level.  As a conse-
quence, the low-risk applicants are driven from the market.72
This result is inefficient because the low-risk applicant wants to
purchase insurance but will not because the premium is too high.
In summary, two guiding principles come from this economic
analysis.  First, when the agent’s unobservable actions influence
the probability of the uncertain outcome, the optimal contract
does not fully insure the agent.  Instead, the contract places some
of the risk on the agent to encourage her to engage in risk-reduc-
ing activities.  Second, the proper insurance premium should re-
flect the inherent risk the agent presents—low-risk applicants
should (and usually do) pay less for insurance than high-risk ap-
plicants.  If asymmetric information prevents such price discrimi-
nation, the market will have a tendency to unravel, leaving only
high-risk applicants in the insurance pool.
B. Asymmetric Information and Mandatory Arbitration
To apply the framework, consider the following two-stage ex-
ample.  First, the employee suffers discrimination or perceives
that she has been the victim of discrimination and this event
leads to a claim.  Second, if a claim arises, the dispute goes to
arbitration or litigation, depending on the terms of the employ-
ment contract.
Again, assume two possible states of nature: bad and good.  In
the bad state, the employee files a claim—she either suffers an
injury or perceives she has suffered an injury.  In the good state,
the employee does not file a claim.  Naturally, the employee’s
perceptions about discrimination and her choice of whether or
not to file suit will depend on the employer’s actions.  I will re-
turn to this point later.  For now, make the untenable assumption
that the employer’s activities do not influence which of the two
states occurs.
In litigation, once the employee files suit, the employer’s pay-
out might consist of attorney’s fees, a punitive damages award, or
a class-action lawsuit—all three leading to a large settlement or
72 This is an example of the so-called “lemons” problem. See  George A. Akerlof,
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488, 489-90, 492-94 (1970).
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trial expense.73  In short, the employer faces a large payout if a
discrimination dispute is resolved through litigation.74
Three attributes prevent similar costs in arbitration.  First, ar-
bitrators rarely award punitive damages.75  Second, the conven-
tional wisdom is that attorney’s fees in arbitration are cheaper
than attorney’s fees in litigation.76  Third, generally speaking, ar-
bitration does not allow for class actions.77
These structural differences between arbitration and litigation
clarify the risk-management benefits of arbitration.  Arbitration
reduces the employer’s payout if the employee suffers discrimi-
73 See  Estreicher, Rickshaws , supra  note 4, at 563 (stating that, for high-salaried
employees, “the sheer costs of defending a litigation and the risks of a jury trial
create considerable settlement value irrespective of the substantive merits of the
underlying claim”); see also  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(1)-(4) (1994) (providing for
punitive damages in the case of intentional discrimination, but capping both punitive
and compensatory damages based on the size of the employer, as measured by the
number of employees).
74 This part argues that the expected payout in arbitration is lower than the ex-
pected payout in litigation.  This might be true for a certain class of employers
only—high-risk employers.  Part III.D.2. considers the difference between low-risk
and high-risk employers.
75 Reilly, supra  note 2, at 1212; see  Stipanowich, supra  note 5, at 17 § nn.91-92
(noting studies from the securities area that found punitive damages were awarded
in approximately 2.0% of all surveyed arbitration cases).
76 See  Estreicher, Rickshaws , supra  note 4, at 564 n.14; Douglas Yarn, Foreward:
An Introduction to Ethics in a World of Mandatory Arbitration , 18 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 903, 904 (2002) (stating that arbitration “has many advantages—speed and cost
savings over litigation being touted as two of the primary ones”).  Note, however,
that Deborah Hensler has questioned the conventional wisdom regarding the rela-
tive costs and benefits of court-annexed arbitration.  She finds that the “savings in
lawyer time are often modest and not necessarily passed on to litigants through
lower legal fees.”  Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The
Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation , 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1587, 1593 (1995).  For most of this Article, I follow the conventional wisdom
and assume that the attorney’s fees in arbitration are lower than attorney’s fees in
litigation. But see  Menkel-Meadow, supra  note 12, at 58 (“We have little empirical
verification of the claims made both for and against arbitration and ADR, including
positive assertions made about reduced cost, speed, and access to dispute
mechanisms.”).
77 See  Reilly, supra  note 2, at 1211.  Notably, some states have started to recog-
nize class-wide arbitration proceedings. See, e.g. , Robert Jason Herndon, Mistaken
Interpretation: The American Arbitration Association , Green Tree Financial Corpo-
ration v. Bazzle, and the Real State of Class-Action Arbitration in North Carolina , 82
N.C. L. REV. 2128, 2129 (2004) (discussing “both the policy arguments and legal
bases supporting a decision by North Carolina to follow South Carolina to allow
class-action arbitration when a contract is silent on the issue”).  Last term, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the arbitrator should decide whether an arbitration provi-
sion forbids arbitration class actions. See  Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).  Despite this creep in class action arbitration, the prevailing
wisdom is that class actions are less available in arbitration than litigation.
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nation and files suit.  By eliminating the chance of a large jury
verdict or class-action lawsuit, mandatory arbitration insulates
the employer from some of the risk that flows from the filing of
discrimination claims.78
C. Accounting for Moral Hazard
Mandatory arbitration does not fully insulate the employer
from paying for discriminatory conduct in the workplace.  In-
stead, the employee and the employer share the risk.  This makes
sense.  The employer’s actions influence whether there is discrim-
ination or the perception of discrimination in the workplace.
Moral hazard remains a possibility.  Therefore, the optimal “risk-
sharing” arrangement places some risk on the employer.
Mandatory arbitration accomplishes this goal.  Because arbi-
trators rule on the merits, the employer will pay more if a claim is
filed.  The employer bears some of the risk associated with its
actions.  This risk-bearing gives the employer an incentive to en-
gage in preventive measures.  This incentive flows from the em-
ployer’s desire to reduce the employee’s chance of prevailing in
arbitration, as well as to reduce the extent of the possible award.
Nevertheless, because of arbitrators’ reluctance to render large
awards and the elimination of class actions, the employer does
not bear the same amount of risk in arbitration as it does in liti-
gation.  In theory, mandatory arbitration accounts for the trade-
off between insurance and incentives.  Through mandatory
arbitration, an employer avoids the large payouts resulting from
the randomness of the discriminatory activities of its agents and
discrimination perceptions generally.  At the same time,
mandatory arbitration maintains the employer’s incentive to
monitor, select, and train its employees.
D. Repeat Players, Wage Effects, and Relevant Evidence
Marc Galanter has argued that repeat players in the legal sys-
tem have a systematic advantage over “one-shot” players.79  Ga-
lanter identified a number of reasons for this advantage.  First,
repeat players have “advance intelligence,” enabling them to
78 Accord  Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration under Assault:  Trial Lawyers Lead the
Charge , Cato Policy Analysis No. 433, at 9 (Apr. 18, 2002), at  http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa-433es.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005) (noting that through arbitration,
“the business gets lower process costs and, perhaps, reduced exposure to big-dollar
jury awards and class actions”).
79 See  Galanter, supra  note 12.
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structure transactions appropriately to anticipate legal action.80
Second, the repeat player has access to specialists, enjoys econo-
mies of scale, and benefits from “low start-up costs for any
case.”81  Third, the repeat player has “opportunities to develop
facilitative informal relations with institutional incumbents.”82
Fourth, a repeat player must maintain credibility and reputation
in bargaining.  This credibility makes it easier for the repeat
player to commit to a bargaining position.83  Fifth, a repeat
player can “play the odds” and “adopt strategies calculated to
maximize gain over a long series of cases, even where this [strat-
egy] involves . . . maximum loss in some cases.”84  Sixth, the re-
peat player has an incentive to shape the law in her favor through
expenditures such as lobbying.85  Seventh, the repeat player has
an incentive to litigate, as opposed to settle, “cases which [he or
she regards] as most likely to produce favorable rules.”86
Using Galanter’s framework, some scholars maintain that em-
ployers enjoy a systematic advantage over employees in arbitra-
tion.  These scholars contend that arbitration tends to favor
employers because employers are repeat players at arbitration
whereas employees are not.87  In fact, some critics of mandatory
arbitration argue that employers impose arbitration as a condi-
tion of employment to secure this repeat-player advantage.88
A risk-based analysis offers a different take on the “repeat
player” effect.  The fact that employees have alleged discrimina-
tion claims against the employer in the past reveals something
about the unobservable characteristics of that employer’s work-
place, namely, the discriminatory tendencies of the employer’s
agents.  This information can be used to construct an employer’s
“risk profile.”  The employer’s risk profile represents a predic-
tion about the likelihood of future discrimination claims against
that employer.  This risk profile is what determines the benefits
of mandatory arbitration.  The more likely an employer is to face
80 Id . at 98.
81 Id .
82 Id . at 98-99.
83 Id .
84 Id . at 99-100.
85 Id . at 100.
86 Id . at 101.
87 See  Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 60-61; Bingham, supra  note 12, at 231 (noting
that the EEOC maintains that “mandatory arbitration has a built-in bias for the
employer who is a repeat player”).
88 See  Sternlight, Panacea , supra  note 2, at 684-85.
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discrimination claims, the greater the benefits of mandatory
arbitration.
To make the point, consider the liability insurance market for
discrimination claims.  In this market, insurance contracts require
that employers reveal their discrimination history as a pre-condi-
tion to coverage.89  The premium is based on this history, with
repeat discriminators (like accident-prone drivers) paying higher
premiums.  Insurance carriers, at least, believe that an em-
ployer’s discrimination history is an important predictor of future
discrimination claims.  The link between liability insurance con-
tracts and mandatory arbitration yields the insight that the repeat
discriminator gains more than the one-time discriminator from
the risk-management benefits that mandatory arbitration offers.
The reason is that the repeat discriminator, as a statistical matter,
is more likely to face another claim, including a claim that carries
with it the chance of punitive damages.
The next step is to ask whether the cost of mandatory arbitra-
tion, like the cost of liability insurance, corresponds to the dis-
crimination risk profile of the employer.  In other words, does
the high-risk employer actually pay more to use mandatory arbi-
tration?  If not, the market will have a tendency to separate.  In
addressing the cost question, I first consider the impact of
mandatory arbitration on wages.
1. Wage Effects
Although the idea is controversial, some scholars argue that
wages respond to the presence or absence of an arbitration
clause in an employment contract.90  In other words, through
higher wages, the employer compensates the employee for sell-
ing labor and  agreeing to bear the risk of discrimination or the
perception of discrimination.  Yet, to avoid the unraveling of the
market, the wage payment must match the specific risk presented
by the employer.91  Analogous to the increased premiums paid
for liability insurance, the high-risk or repeat discriminator
should pay more for the benefits of mandatory arbitration.  Re-
89 See , e.g. , Kemper, Employment Practice Liability Insurance Application (on
file with author); Peterson International Underwriters, Application for Employment
Practices Liability Insurance with Third Party Discrimination Coverage, available at
http://www.piu.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
90 See  Hylton, supra  note 4, at 224-26.
91 Infra  note 107 and accompanying text provides a complete description of the R
negative effects of an unraveling market.
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quiring that employers reveal their discrimination history before
the employee is bound by the employment contract should help
to achieve this result.92
Revelation of the discrimination history is not enough, how-
ever.  The wage demand must also respond to (1) the presence or
absence of an arbitration provision and (2) the employer’s dis-
crimination history.  However, the notion that employees are
compensated for agreeing to mandatory arbitration is not univer-
sally accepted.  Many scholars argue that wages are not sensitive
to the inclusion of an arbitration clause because “an employee
can only attempt to gain [wage] concessions if he fully appreci-
ates the disadvantages or costs arising from the non-negotiable
portions of the agreement [i.e., the arbitration clause].”93  The
rational employee, however, will not invest time and resources
reading the proposed employment agreement.94  The expected
cost of reading the complete agreement is likely to outweigh the
expected benefits, especially if the arbitration clause concerns
unlikely consequences and “appear[s] in small print and/or [is]
defined using obscure language.”95  Because the employee will
not likely read, appreciate, or understand the arbitration provi-
sion, the employer that includes an arbitration provision in an
employment contract most likely can avoid having to pay higher
wages.96
The counter to this argument is to craft a market response—
the emergence of an entrepreneurial firm offering an employ-
92 The counter-argument to this proposal follows:  If the wage contains an implicit
premium, those employers with no discrimination history will have an incentive to
reveal that information to the employee in order to pay a lower premium and, con-
sequently, a lower wage.  The market will have a tendency to separate itself.  Repeat
discriminators that employ mandatory arbitration provisions will pay higher wages
than non-repeat discriminators that employ mandatory arbitration provisions.  The
lack of a discrimination history works like a warranty, signaling, in effect, the quality
of the workplace.
This market solution might not work.  The employer that reveals its discrimination
history, or lack thereof, might actually encourage claims by alerting employees to
their rights.  This possibility imposes a cost on firms that attempt to signal “quality”
through the revelation of a favorable discrimination history.  A requirement that all
employers reveal their discrimination history solves this problem.  With this require-
ment, all workers, not just workers of signaling firms, are alerted to their rights.
93 Cole, supra  note 2, at 475.
94 Cole, supra  note 2, at 475; Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 57 (noting the adherent is
“unlikely to undertake the time and expense to research the implications of an arbi-
tration clause or obtain legal advice”).
95 Cole, supra  note 2, at 475.
96 See id . at 475-76.
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ment contract without an arbitration provision.97  Because the
entrepreneurial firm forgoes the benefits of mandatory arbitra-
tion, that firm should be able to offer lower wages and still attract
workers.  Responding to this proposal, scholars retreat from the
rational actor model and assert that employees suffer from some
sort of cognitive bias.98  As a consequence of this supposed bias,
employees are not likely to properly value and assess the risk of a
lawsuit.99  Employees, therefore, “settle for lower wages and
benefits than they would demand if they fully understood the
risks of arbitration as compared to litigation.”100
If cognitive errors and biases limit the ability of employees to
price the premium for the benefits that mandatory arbitration of-
fers, one possible conclusion is to outlaw mandatory arbitration
altogether.  Indeed, some critics of mandatory arbitration take
this position because they believe that the wage demand is not
responsive.101  But this conclusion is premature.  With no wage
effect, mandatory arbitration appears to benefit the employer at
the employee’s expense.  If this is true, the puzzle identified in
the introduction returns: Why does not every employment con-
tract include a mandatory arbitration provision?102  The next sub-
97 See id . at 479-80.  Hylton, supra  note 4, at 252-53, offers a related market re-
sponse to the uninformed employee, suggesting that “a competing firm [could] gain
by informing the applicant of the risks and offering a superior arrangement.”
98 A retreat from the rational actor model is not necessary. Avery Katz has
demonstrated that “[i]f buyers fail to read the fine print, sellers writing standardized
[contracts] have [an] incentive to choose the quality level as low as possible.”  Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance:  Game Theory and the Law of
Contract Formation , 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 287 (1990).  By the same reasoning, the
employer that inserts a mandatory arbitration provision in fine print need not fear a
demand for higher wages if the applicant is unlikely to read the arbitration
provision.
99 Cole, supra  note 2, at 480-82; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 57 (“In her ignorant
position, the adherent is most likely to undervalue the right to a judicial forum.”).
100 Cole, supra  note 2, at 481.
101 See  Schwartz, supra  note 2, at 116.
102 In raising this question, I rely on the fact that the Supreme Court legitimized
the use of mandatory arbitration in 1991, the year it decided Gilmer .  In 1992, about
ten percent of employers used mandatory dispute resolution and an additional eight
percent were considering the idea. HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE SEC-
TOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 & n.10, 8 (July 1995).
In 1997, the GAO reported that nineteen percent of employers use arbitration. U.S
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’ EX-
PERIENCE WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE, Letter Report, 2 (1997).  The 1995 and
1997 GAO studies represent the latest and best evidence available on the use of
arbitration.  In 2002, the Court in Circuit City , at least indirectly, resolved any uncer-
tainty about the scope of Gilmer .  We do not have figures on how many employers
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE302.txt unknown Seq: 25  5-APR-05 15:01
A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration 885
section considers this puzzle in some detail, assuming first that
wages adjust and then analyzing the puzzle if wages do not
adjust.
2. Relevant Evidence
To avoid adverse selection, the expected award and/or wages
need to fluctuate with the ex ante  risk presented by the specific
employer.  In practice, we know that neither the award nor wages
adjusts to the employer’s risk profile.  Without this adjustment,
the market will have a tendency to unravel.  The employers that
gain the most from the risk management benefits of mandatory
arbitration—the repeat discriminators—will use mandatory arbi-
tration.  Other employers will litigate because the total cost of
mandatory arbitration (wage premiums plus the expected award)
does not reflect their specific risk level.103  Restated, the one-
time discriminator resolves its disputes in litigation, while the se-
rial discriminator resolves its disputes in arbitration.
This market segmentation provides an alternative explanation
for the puzzling outcomes of discrimination litigation.  As an em-
pirical matter, a substantial fraction of discrimination claims that
are litigated end in summary judgment for the employer.104
use mandatory arbitration today.  Arguably, Circuit City  rather than Gilmer  repre-
sents the watershed moment in the legitimization of mandatory arbitration.  My re-
sults do not turn on the exact number of employers using mandatory arbitration so
long as some employers use mandatory arbitration and others do not.  This is a rea-
sonable assumption given that discrimination cases continue to fill the federal
docket.
103 See  Hylton, supra  note 4, at 240 (making a similar adverse selection argument
when the applicant does not know the employer’s type: high-risk or low-risk).
104 Stewart Schwab has thoroughly analyzed the discrimination case outcomes.
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Cases Fare in the Federal
Courts: An Empirical Analysis  at 3 (May 19, 2001) (report filed in the fairness hear-
ing for Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co. , 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001)) (on file with
author).  According to Schwab, “16 percent of all employment discrimination cases
are resolved by pretrial motion.”  Of the cases resolved by pretrial motion, defend-
ants prevail 96 percent of the time.  Schwab compares this pretrial win rate to other
kinds of cases, finding that across all cases plaintiffs win 19 percent of the pretrial
motions.  Schwab concludes that “[a]t every stage of litigation, plaintiffs have a more
difficult time in employment discrimination cases than in virtually any other cate-
gory of cases.” Id.  at 1.  Schwab analyzed data from 1970-1997. Id.  Schwab’s sam-
ple is too large for my purposes, including case outcomes from before the emergence
of mandatory arbitration.
To solve this problem, I replicated Schwab’s results, restricting attention to the
time period when mandatory arbitration was available.  If my thesis is correct, one
should observe an increase in the summary judgment numbers favoring employers
as more high-risk employers opt out of litigation into arbitration.  As a starting date
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Scholars suggest that this occurs because federal judges exhibit a
bias against plaintiffs in discrimination cases and are therefore
willing to grant employers summary judgment despite the exis-
tence of legitimate questions of fact.105
According to the market segmentation argument, the summary
judgment numbers reflect the fact that the employers most likely
to lose on summary judgment—the repeat discriminators—have
opted out of litigation and are now using arbitration to resolve
disputes.  This analysis generates an interesting insight.  Even if
the incidence of discrimination has not decreased over the last
ten years, there would still be an increase in the percentage of
employers winning on summary judgment as a result of high-risk
employers’ insuring themselves through arbitration, leaving only
the low-risk employers to the tools of litigation and summary
judgment.106  Conversely, for this same reason, a higher percent-
for my sample, I use 1991, the year in which the Supreme Court decided Gilmer .
Between 1991 and 2000, employers prevailed in ninety-seven percent of the pretrial
motions.  The data exhibit a rough upward trend.  In 1991, employers prevailed in
ninety-five percent of the pretrial motions.  In 2000, employers prevailed in ninety-
eight percent of the pretrial motions.  These data are at least consistent with my
thesis, although the increase in the employer win-rate is admittedly small.  (data and
results on file with author).  Perhaps, more important is my claim that the win-rates
for employers should continue to increase over time.  This is a prediction of the
model, which can be tested as data become available.  The data for this truncated
study came from the Administrative Office dataset, the same dataset used by
Schwab.  The data is available at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questtr2.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005).
105 See  Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environ-
ment Cases , 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 73 (1999); Judith Olans Brown et al.,
Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A
Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue , 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1490
(1997); Laura Gatland, Courts Behaving Badly:  Task Forces Say Some Judges Impa-
tient with Job Bias Cases , 83 A.B.A. J. 30 (1997); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title
VII and ADEA Cases , 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 236 (1993); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter
of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments , 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WO-
MEN’S STUD. 311, 314-15 (1999); Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext:
Resolving the Summary Judgement Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases
Alleging Disparate Treatment , 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 37, 68 (2000).
106 Low-risk employers are more likely to prevail on summary judgment because,
almost by definition, a claim against a low-risk employer is more likely to be the
result of a heightened proclivity to file suit rather than actionable discrimination.
This theory assumes that the win-rates on summary judgment are indicative of the
merits of the pool of cases being litigated.  This assumption ignores the possibility of
settlement.  Suppose, for example, that both the employer and the employee know
that discrimination cases in litigation are usually against low-risk employers.  With
this knowledge, the employer has the incentive to offer a low settlement, which the
plaintiff will accept, rather than take the chance of losing on summary judgment.
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age of arbitration cases should be resolved in favor of
employees.107
For scholars and policymakers concerned about the impact of
arbitration on the evolution of the law, this theory—if tested and
verified—is perhaps disconcerting.108 Under this argument, the
law is based on cases against low-risk employers, not high-risk
employers.  And, for this reason, the law might evolve in favor of
employers.
Note, too, that the market segmentation idea does not hinge
on the assumption that the employee who agrees to mandatory
arbitration receives a higher wage.  As many have conjectured,
wages may not respond at all to the presence of the arbitration
provision.  The above analysis presupposes that the employer’s
expected payout is less in arbitration than in litigation.  For two
reasons, however, this might not be true for every employer.
First, arbitration usually does not offer the opportunity for sum-
To make sense of market segmentation, the win-rates must be linked to the pool of
cases, paying attention to the possibility of settlement.
To do this, I rely on some results derived by Lucian Bebchuk.  Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information , 15 RAND. J. ECON.
404, 406-09 (1984).  Bebchuk models settlement as a game between a defendant with
private information and a plaintiff.  The defendant’s private information is the plain-
tiff’s chance of prevailing in litigation, which lies in the interval, d  and ∂´ and is
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function, F(d).  The plaintiff
makes the offer, which the defendant accepts or rejects.  Bebchuk shows that when
the interval shifts up or down the chance of settlement remains the same. Id.  at 410-
11.  This means the chance of litigation remains the same, too.  In this settlement
game, the win-rates broadly reflect the merits (i.e., the interval, [d , ∂´] of the underly-
ing pool of cases litigated.   This is, of course, one of many ways to model settlement.
The settlement literature is vast and I do not discuss it all in this Article.  Here,
however, the Bebchuk model makes some sense because the employer in a discrimi-
nation case is apt to have private information bearing on the case (i.e., firm data and
records that are not easy to discover).
107 The available empirical evidence supports this finding. See  Maltby, supra  note
4, at 46 (finding that “employees prevail more often in arbitration than in court”);
see also  Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Reso-
lution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights? , 58 DISP. RES.
J. 56, 58 (Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004) (finding estimates showing that “[a]fter taking into
account legal fees, the plaintiffs receive more on average with arbitration”); Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims:
An Empirical Comparison , 58 DISP. RES. J. 44, 48, at Table 1 (Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004)
(finding that higher paid employees prevail more often in the arbitration of civil
rights claims than the litigation of employment discrimination claims in federal court
(although this difference is statistically insignificant)).
108 A researcher might test this theory by comparing the discrimination history of
employers that use mandatory arbitration with the discrimination history of employ-
ers that litigate.  I leave this empirical inquiry to future research.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE302.txt unknown Seq: 28  5-APR-05 15:01
888 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
mary judgment.109  Second, at least in some states, the employer
must front the arbitration fees to render the mandatory arbitra-
tion clause enforceable.110  Intuitively, then, the low-risk em-
ployer might opt for litigation in order to avoid the risk of
resolving a discrimination claim in a forum with arbitration fees
and without summary judgment.  In contrast, the high-risk em-
ployer might opt for arbitration to avoid the possibility of a jury
trial and a punitive damage award (risks that the high-risk em-
ployer is particularly concerned about).  Not surprisingly, in de-
ciding whether to use mandatory arbitration, the employer
compares the expected costs of arbitrating and litigating a dis-
crimination dispute.  In short, arbitration might not offer any
benefit to the low-risk employer because the payout in arbitra-
tion is actually greater than the litigation payout.111
To solve the market segmentation problem, I suggest that arbi-
trators consider the employer’s discrimination history in fashion-
ing the arbitration award.112  After a finding of liability, the
109 See  Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality , 76 IND. L.J. 591, 593-97 (2001) (noting that in arbitration “[t]he rules
of evidence generally do not apply, discovery and motions practices are not used”).
110 Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785-86  (9th Cir.
2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Cole v.
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., concurring).
111 Deborah Hensler’s work questioning the cost-effectiveness of arbitration but-
tresses this conclusion. See Hensler, supra  note 76.  In terms of expected payout,
including attorney’s fees and claim frequency, for some employers arbitration might
not be cheaper than litigation.
Strictly speaking, if there is no wage adjustment, there is no adverse selection.
Instead, employers simply self-select into the cheapest forum for dispute resolution.
Because the arbitration clause does not affect the wage, the fact that bad employers
opt out of the litigation system does not impact the “price” (in terms of increased
wages) good employers pay for using arbitration—the central feature of adverse
selection.  I am agnostic about whether wages adjust.  My point here is to show that
the same market segmentation can occur, with or without a wage adjustment.
112 Under this approach, large employers are apt to suffer more claims and, as a
result, face a greater chance of a ratcheted award.  This is easy to fix by ratcheting
based on the “rate” of claims, rather than the number of claims.  A rate approach
controls for company size.  Such approaches, so-called “experience rating,” are com-
mon.  For example, state governments use experience rating to compute the amount
of money an employer must pay into the unemployment insurance fund.  Control-
ling for company size, the more likely the firm is to have layoffs, the more the com-
pany must pay into the unemployment insurance pool. See  Tom Baker, Containing
the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification , 9 CONN. INS.
L.J. 371, 388-89 (2002/2003) (explaining the use of experience rating for unemploy-
ment insurance and stating that  “[e]xperience rating is the insurance term for charg-
ing different prices based on past experience. It is a form of risk classification
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employer’s discrimination history should serve as a ratchet, in-
creasing the arbitration award for the discrimination-prone em-
ployer and decreasing the award for the one-time
discriminator.113
The enforcement of this proposal is possible even if individual
arbitrators are reluctant to adopt the practice.114  The proposal
could be incorporated into the Due Process Protocol for Media-
tion and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Em-
ployment Relationship .115  Responding to Gilmer , this Protocol
represented an effort by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
(JAMS) to address the fairness problems associated with the
mandatory arbitration of discrimination disputes.116  The AAA
and JAMS are two major providers of arbitration services.  Both
of these organizations refuse to provide arbitration services un-
less the parties agree to the Protocol.117  The Protocol therefore
influences the way in which many arbitration proceedings are
conducted.
E. Using Risk-Management in the Adequacy-Based and
Contract-Based Exceptions
A risk-based analysis informs the adequacy-based and con-
tract-based exceptions to the enforcement of mandatory arbitra-
because past experience is used to predict future risk. So, for example, an employer
that has laid off significant numbers of workers in the past is treated as a higher risk
for layoffs in the future and, accordingly, is charged a higher rate”).
113 Under the ratchet system, the savvy employee might wait to file, knowing that
the last employee to successfully file reaps the largest award.  Allocating part of the
ratcheted award to employees who have filed in the past alleviates this problem.
The ratchet system proposed is not unheard of for corporate penalties.  The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, for example, consider the employer’s past history at sen-
tencing. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(c) (2004).
114 Individual arbitrators might be wary of adopting this practice because it harms
the repeat discriminator—a valuable source of business for the individual arbitrator.
On the other hand, this practice makes arbitration attractive to low-risk employers,
increasing the volume of business.  It is hard to say which effect would dominate.  As
a result, it is not clear that individual arbitrators would necessarily be opposed to the
ratchet system proposed here.
115 Due Process Protocol for Mediation of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the
Employment Relationship, BNA DAILY REPORT, at A-8, E-11 (May 11, 1995); see
also  Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit , 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 775-77 (2001) (describing the Due Process
Protocol).
116 Cole , supra  note 116. R
117 Id.  at 776
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tion provisions in employment contracts.  As discussed, under
the adequacy-based exception, the employee may avoid arbitra-
tion by showing that her statutory rights cannot be vindicated in
the arbitral forum.118  The employee must show that arbitration
is not a substitute forum, but rather no forum at all.  Under the
contract-based exception, the employee may seek revocation on
generally applicable state law grounds such as duress, fraud, or
unconscionability.119
1. The Adequacy-Based Exception
The adequacy-based exception has a clear analog within the
new framework. If the arbitral forum is inadequate, the employer
pays the same in both good and bad states; that is, the employee
will not file suit, whether or not she suffers or perceives she suf-
fers discrimination.  It is not worth the employee’s effort to file in
an inadequate arbitral forum.  Knowing that a claim is unlikely,
the employer will not take steps to mitigate the chance of dis-
crimination perceptions.  In particular, the employer will not try
to control the discriminatory activities of its agents.  With an in-
adequate arbitral forum the employer no longer bears any  risk
associated with its activities.  The threat of dispute resolution in
arbitration ceases to function as a deterrent.
The inadequate arbitral forum is a variation of the classic
waiver argument.  The inadequate arbitral forum allows the em-
ployer to turn a blind eye to the discriminatory activities of its
agents and to ignore the possibility of discrimination perceptions
by the employee.  In effect, the applicant who agrees to an inade-
quate arbitral forum waives her right to have the employer at-
tempt to control the discriminatory activities of its agents.
With an inadequate forum, the employee bears all the risk of
discriminatory activities by other agents of the employer.  Note,
here, the risk of discrimination does not go away with an inade-
quate forum; it shifts from the employer to the employee.120  This
118 See supra  note 36 and accompanying text. R
119 See supra  note 35 and accompanying text. R
120 It is for this reason that I model arbitration as risk management as opposed to
risk reduction.  It is easiest to see the “management” angle in the case of a waiver of
a right to bring a discrimination claim.  The underlying random event is the discrimi-
natory conduct of the employer’s agents, which causes injury.  Assume the harm
takes place; the question, then, is who pays.  If the employee waives her right to sue
(accepts an inadequate arbitral forum), the employee absorbs the injury.  The injury
still takes place, but the employer has shifted the risk to the employee.  From the
employer’s standpoint, the risk is reduced.  But the harm caused by the underlying
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risk bearing is costly for the risk-averse employee, especially be-
cause she cannot mitigate its effects by diversifying away the
chance of discrimination or buying insurance for discrimination
injuries through the market.121  And, it is for this reason only, I
would argue, that an agreement to arbitrate in an inadequate fo-
rum is problematic.
2. Unconscionability
Turning to the other exception, the most popular “contract-
based” challenge is unconscionability.  As a legal concept, uncon-
scionability is imprecise.  A suitable working definition comes
from Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.:  “Unconsciona-
bility has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.”122  Following this language, scholars have divided uncon-
scionability into two components: procedural and substantive.123
Procedural unconscionability refers to defects in the bargaining
process that result in an “absence of meaningful choice,” broadly
defined to include the use of fine print, convoluted language, and
an inequality of bargaining power.124  Substantive unconsciona-
bility refers to the reasonableness or fairness of the resulting bar-
gain.125  Although analytically distinct, courts usually require a
combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability
before striking down a contract as unconscionable.  Generally
speaking, the greater the amount of procedural unconscionabil-
ity, the less substantive unconscionability is needed to invalidate
the contract.126
random event still occurs.  Holding constant any incentive effects, the way I think of
it is as follows:  As the arbitration clause becomes more and more favorable to the
employee, the employer bears more of the risk (pays for a higher fraction of the
injury) and the employee pays less.  In the limit—no arbitration, just litigation—the
employer bears all the risk of discriminatory conduct by its employees and discrimi-
nation perceptions more generally.  Alternatively, one could, I suppose, model arbi-
tration as a form of risk reduction.
121 Of course, if the wage is adjusted appropriately (including compensation for
bearing the risk of discrimination), the employee might be better off agreeing to an
inadequate arbitral forum. See  Hylton, supra note 4, at 262. As noted, my position
does not rely on wage adjusting in response to an arbitration provision.
122 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
123 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 311 (3d ed. 1999)
124 Id.  at 311-12.
125 Id.
126 Id.  at 312-13 (collecting cases).
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Applying these principles, several state and federal courts have
found a mandatory arbitration provision in an employment con-
tract to be unconscionable.127  Such findings are not universal,
however, as several other courts have upheld arbitration provi-
sions in the face of unconscionability challenges.128  Further-
more, through Gilmer  and Circuit City , the Supreme Court
clarified that the mere inclusion of a mandatory arbitration pro-
vision in an employment contract is not unconscionable per se.129
What then makes a mandatory arbitration provision unconscion-
able?  How can a court distinguish a valid arbitration provision
from an invalid arbitration provision?
The case law provides some clues to answering these questions.
In the usual case of unconscionability, the court first declares
that the employment contract is adhesive and therefore proce-
durally unconscionable.130  The court reaches this result in two
steps.  First, the court asserts that the employee had to sign the
arbitration provision as a condition of employment.  Second, the
court notes that the arbitration provision was non-negotiable.131
After finding the employment contract procedurally uncon-
127 See  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2002);
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782-85 (9th Cir. 2002);
Cooper v. MRM Inv., Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777-79 (M.D. Tenn. 2002);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 689-94 (Cal. 2000) (dis-
cussing unconscionability under the rubric of “objections to arbitration that apply
more generally to any type of arbitration imposed on the employee by the employer
as a condition of employment, regardless of [whether that claim involved an unwaiv-
able statutory right]”).  The bulk of Armendariz  deals with the “adequacy-based”
exception.
128 Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999); Seus
v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 177, 184 (3d Cir. 1998); Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1999) (re-
jecting the unconscionability argument, but refusing to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment on other grounds); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 498, 501-03 (4th
Cir. 2002).  Most of these cases involve arbitration provisions contained in U-4
forms—the securities registration form at issue in Gilmer . See  Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  In all these cases, the employee had to
sign the U-4 form and register with the various exchanges as a condition of employ-
ment.  However, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court does not view the U-4
form as part of an employment contract. Id . at 25 n.2.  Presumably, the circuits
would apply the same unconscionability analysis if the employment contract con-
tained the arbitration provision.
129 See Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 32-33; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
122-23 (2001).
130 See Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 783-84; Circuit City Stores, Inc. , 279 F.3d at 893;
Armendariz , 6 P.3d at 675, 689.
131 Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 783-84; Circuit City Stores, Inc. , 279 F.3d at 892-93;
Armendariz , 6 P.3d at 675, 689.
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scionable, the court reviews the contract terms for substantive
unconscionability.  In conducting this substantive analysis, courts
have paid close attention to three factors.  First, courts have con-
sidered the fee structure imposed by the agreement.132  In Cali-
fornia, for instance, if the agreement requires that the employee
pay any of the arbitration fees, the arbitration provision is
deemed substantively unconscionable.133 Second, courts have ex-
amined whether the agreement is asymmetric; that is, whether
the employee must arbitrate his or her claims against the em-
ployer whereas the employer is allowed to choose between arbi-
tration and litigation for its claims against the employee.134
Finally, courts have considered the degree to which the agree-
ment limits the scope of available relief and discovery.135
A risk-based analysis moves the unconscionability inquiry in a
different direction.  An arbitration provision might be uncon-
scionable because it fails to account for moral hazard and ad-
verse selection.  Courts could uncover such a failure by
comparing the arbitration agreement to the liability insurance
policies available in the market.  Market insurance policies are
unlikely to reflect unequal bargaining power or the lack of mean-
ingful choice.136  For example, suppose that every market insur-
132 Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 785; Circuit City Stores, Inc ., 279 F.3d at 894.  Note that
many courts have considered the fee structure under the adequacy-based exception
rather than as part of an unconscionability analysis. See , e.g. , Cole v. Burns Int’l
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Paladino v. Avnet Computer
Techs., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998).
Indeed, the adequacy exception and substantive unconscionability are not analyti-
cally distinct categories.  The same elements that make an arbitral forum inadequate
will tend to render the arbitration provision one-sided and therefore substantively
unconscionable.
133 Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 785 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc.  for the proposition
that “a fee allocation scheme which requires the employee to split the arbitrator’s
fees with the employer would alone render an arbitration agreement substantively
unconscionable”).
134 E.g., Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 784-85; Circuit City Stores, Inc. , 279 F.3d at 893-94;
Armendariz , 6 P.3d at 691-92.
135 E.g., Ferguson , 298 F.3d at 786-87; Circuit City Stores, Inc. , 279 F.3d at 893-94;
Armendariz , 6 P.3d at 694 (noting that “the unconscionable one-sidedness of the
arbitration agreement is compounded . . . by the fact that it does not permit the full
recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on the
employer”).
As with the fee structure, a number of courts have considered limitations on the
scope of relief under the adequacy exception. Cole , 105 F.3d at 1482, 1485-86;
Paladino , 134 F.3d at 1061-62.
136 In the discrimination context, a market insurance policy reflects a deal be-
tween two companies—the insurance carrier and the employer.
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ance contract requires that employers reveal their discrimination
history as a pre-condition of coverage.  In this example, a court
might consider—as evidence of procedural unconscionability—
that the employer did not reveal its discrimination history to the
employee.  On the other hand, as evidence of substantive uncon-
scionability, the court might examine whether the arbitration
procedure mimics market insurance by punishing repeat discrim-
inators more harshly than one-time discriminators.
Admittedly, this approach to unconscionablity has problems.
A legal regime that forced arbitration procedures to mimic mar-
ket insurance policies would be hard to administer.  First, to ap-
ply a risk-management approach, courts would have to decide
which of the many liability insurance contracts to consider.  Even
assuming that the court could choose a reference contract, a
court would still have to decide whether the failure to match
terms meant that the arbitration provision was unreasonably
one-sided and therefore substantively unconscionable.  In the
run-of-the-mill unconscionability case, the party seeking to avoid
the contract cannot prevail by simply showing that he or she en-
tered into a bad bargain.137
To summarize, the proposal in this subsection is narrow: that
courts should consider the risk-management function of
mandatory arbitration when conducting an unconscionability
analysis.
F. Pre-Dispute Versus Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
In his essay on alternative dispute resolution, Steven Shavell
lists several reasons why parties might agree to pre-dispute,
mandatory arbitration.138  These reasons include an improve-
ment in ex ante  incentives and a beneficial change in the fre-
quency of disputes.139  A risk analysis suggests another reason
137 State ex rel . State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Garley, 806 P.2d 32, 39 (N.M.
1991) (“The doctrine of unconscionability was intended to prevent oppression and
unfair surprise, not to relieve a party of a bad bargain.”) (quoting Drink, Inc. v.
Martinez, 556 P.2d 348, 351 (N.M. 1976)); Frets v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
712 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Kan. 1986) (noting that unconscionability “is directed against
one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts, and not against the conse-
quences per se  of uneven bargaining power or even a simple old-fashioned bad bar-
gain”) (quoting Wille v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976)).
138 Shavell, supra  note 6, at 5-7.  Shavell’s analysis applies to mediation and ab-
breviated trial procedures as well as arbitration.  The discussion here will focus on
arbitration.
139 Id .  To illustrate the incentive argument, consider, as Shavell does, a case in
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why employers might prefer mandatory arbitration.  Through the
mandatory arbitration agreement, the employer limits its expo-
sure if a certain risk materializes.  The employer cannot achieve
the same benefit through a post-dispute arbitration agreement
because, once the employee files the claim, it is too late.  In the
employment discrimination context, the post-dispute arbitration
agreement is analogous to buying automobile accident insurance
to cover an accident that had already taken place.
Responding to proponents who focus on the cost savings asso-
ciated with arbitration, one critic asks, “[I]f binding arbitration
were indeed as wonderful and fair as its advocates claim, why
make it mandatory?  Why not allow employees . . . to choose
arbitration over litigation knowingly, after the dispute has
arisen?”140  Indeed, some scholars have suggested that employers
might provide employees this choice.141  Such an option, how-
ever, destroys the risk management function of mandatory arbi-
tration.  It is not surprising that post-dispute arbitration
agreements are relatively rare in employment discrimination
cases.  Few market insurance carriers agree to cover discrimina-
tion claims that have already been filed against the employer.142
which the arbitrator has more expertise than the court. Id.  at 5-6.  As a result, the
arbitrator can tell whether performance under the contract was substandard whereas
the court cannot.  In this situation, an ex ante  agreement to arbitrate induces good
performance, increasing the value of the contract to one or both parties. Id . at 6.
This same benefit cannot be achieved through a post-dispute arbitration agreement
because, when the parties agree to arbitrate, performance has already occurred. Id.
at 6-7.
The argument about the frequency of suits is subtle.  In the main, Shavell puts
forth an example in which the frequency of suits does not alter the ex ante  incentives
of either party. Id . at 7.  In this case, a high frequency of lawsuits reflects resources
devoted to dispute resolution with little corresponding benefits in terms of incen-
tives.  Under these conditions, the parties are better off agreeing, ex ante , to reduce
the frequency of suits.  This is because the resources saved by avoiding frequent
lawsuits can be split between the parties.  The parties cannot achieve this same bene-
fit through a post-dispute arbitration agreement because, ex post , one of the parties
will want to litigate.  Notably, Shavell’s frequency argument works in the other di-
rection as well. Id.  at 7 n.10.  For example, parties might agree, ex ante , to use an
arbitration procedure that results in more suits because the beneficial incentive ef-
fects outweigh the increase in dispute resolution costs. Id.  at 7.
It is noteworthy that Shavell rejects the argument that parties agree to ex ante
(mandatory) arbitration because arbitration is cheaper and less risky than litigation
(in terms of, for instance, random jury verdicts). Id . at 5.  Shavell argues that parties
can achieve these same benefits through a post-dispute arbitration agreement. Id .
140 Jean R. Sternlight, Steps Need to Be Taken to Prevent Unfairness to Employees,
Consumers , DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 7.
141 Cole, supra  note 2, at 453-54.
142 Supra note 89.
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Likewise, few employees agree to arbitrate after they have per-
ceived discrimination and filed a claim.143
Using a risk-based analysis to compare post-dispute and
mandatory arbitration agreements offers one final insight.  A
post-dispute arbitration agreement does not create an incentive
problem for the employer—there is no moral hazard.  My conjec-
ture is that it is for this reason that the most vocal critics of
mandatory arbitration are nevertheless comfortable with post-
dispute arbitration agreements.
IV
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AND OTHER RISK-REDUCING MECHANISMS
Mandatory arbitration is one of many tools that employers can
use to manage the risk of discrimination claims.  As noted, em-
ployers can also purchase liability insurance through the mar-
ket.144  Moreover, employers can minimize the chance of lawsuits
through strong in-house grievance procedures, diversity training,
and the formulation and promulgation of non-discriminatory cor-
porate policies.  The interaction among these risk-management
techniques provides fertile ground for empirical work.
Mandatory arbitration may function as a substitute for, or a
complement to, liability insurance.  Employers might choose to
use mandatory arbitration as a substitute for three reasons.  First,
although widely available, liability insurance is expensive.145
143 Samuel Estreicher offers another explanation for the rarity of post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate.  Estreicher, Rickshaw , supra  note 4.  Estreicher suggests
that it does not advance the employer’s interest to agree to post-dispute arbitration
when the employee fails to obtain counsel. Id . at 567.  Instead, the employer has an
incentive to let the case languish in the administrative agency. Id .  On the other
hand, if the employee does obtain counsel, it is unlikely that the employee’s attorney
will agree to arbitration, because arbitration reduces the settlement value of the
case. Id . at 567-68. See also  Drahozal, supra  note 4, at 746-78 (arguing that “[trans-
action] costs are likely to be lower for parties entering into predispute arbitration
agreements than those entering into postdispute arbitration agreements”).
144 On the desirability of liability insurance for discrimination disputes, see Joan
Gabel et al., Evolving Conflict Between Standards for Employment Discrimination
Liability and the Delegation of that Liability: Does Employment Practices Liability
Insurance Offer Appropriate Risk Transference? , 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1
(2001).
145 See  Lorelie S. Masters, Protection from the Storm: Insurance Coverage for Em-
ployment Liability , 53 BUS. LAW. 1249, 1274 (1998) (“Although prices have come
down as more insurance companies enter the EPLI [liability insurance] market,
EPLI coverage still is fairly expensive.”).
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Second, when a discrimination claim arises, the parties often con-
test whether the claim falls within the coverage limits of the lia-
bility insurance policy.146  Similar coverage disputes do not arise
with mandatory arbitration, because the risk-management bene-
fits of mandatory arbitration accrue no matter what kind of claim
is asserted against the employer.  Third, liability insurance poli-
cies usually cap the amount of payment on the policy and exclude
coverage for punitive damages.147  There are no similar restric-
tions with mandatory arbitration.
Despite this analysis, the conclusion that mandatory arbitra-
tion represents an inexpensive substitute for liability insurance is
debatable.  Mandatory arbitration and liability insurance might
work in tandem.  Depending on the terms, a liability insurance
policy will cover the attorney’s fees and the award from arbitra-
tion or litigation.148  Presumably, then, the insurer will set the
premium based in part on whether the employer uses mandatory
arbitration.149
As a matter of theory, both the complement story and the sub-
stitute story are plausible.150  Without some empirical evidence,
however, it is impossible to tell which story is true.  Echoing a
theme running throughout the Article, the risk-management vi-
sion of mandatory arbitration leads to new questions—namely,
what is the exact relationship between liability insurance and
mandatory arbitration?  Do employers that use mandatory arbi-
tration also purchase liability insurance through the market?
In practice, mandatory arbitration and liability insurance do
146 The insurance policies often exclude “intentional” acts. Id .  How this exclu-
sion plays out in the context of any particular discrimination claim is hard to say.
Mandatory arbitration contains no exclusions from coverage.  Hence, from the em-
ployer’s standpoint, mandatory arbitration might represent a better way to manage
risk.
147 Id . at 1273-74.
148 Chaney, supra  note 63, at 126 (“An EPLI [liability insurance] policy usually R
defines a claim as including any civil proceeding, administrative charge, or arbitra-
tion request arising out of an alleged covered employment practice.”).
149 If mandatory arbitration is indeed cheaper than litigation for the employer, the
liability insurance premium for an employer that uses mandatory arbitration should
reflect this cost savings.  Hence, holding all else constant, an inquiry into premiums
provides a fruitful way to test the relative costs and benefits of arbitration and
litigation.
150 A brief online survey of EPLI insurance policies revealed that six out of fifty-
one policies asked employers whether they used mandatory dispute resolution.  This
provides some preliminary support for the hypothesis that liability insurance and
mandatory arbitration are substitutes.  Clearly, a deeper empirical inquiry is needed
before we can draw any conclusions with confidence.
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the same thing: they allow employers to avoid paying the entire
price of discrimination claims.  Outlawing mandatory arbitration,
in and of itself, would not force employers to bear the entire risk
of the discriminatory activities of their agents, as is assumed by
the critics of mandatory arbitration.  This simple point demon-
strates the mistakes that occur when analyzing mandatory arbi-
tration in a vacuum.  To avoid these mistakes, I suggest that
scholars consider the interactions among the risk-management
devices available to employers when making policy proposals re-
garding mandatory arbitration.151
CONCLUSION
The debate over mandatory arbitration is widespread and
politicized in the public discourse, the courts, and the academy.
Parties to this debate, however, have largely ignored the most
important role of mandatory arbitration.  Using the risk frame-
work, this Article challenges much of the conventional wisdom
about these provisions.  In addition, this Article is designed as a
springboard for empirical work.  For example, scholars might ex-
amine whether repeat discriminators do worse in arbitration than
one-time discriminators.  Alternatively, scholars might investi-
gate whether firms that employ mandatory arbitration provisions
have a worse discrimination history than firms that do not em-
ploy such provisions.
Before concluding that mandatory arbitration is a good or bad
idea, it is crucial to understand: (1) the risk-management role
mandatory arbitration plays, and (2) the way mandatory arbitra-
tion interacts with liability insurance and other risk-management
devices.  This Article proposes an answer to the first question.
The second question is empirical and requires further study.
151 To my knowledge, only one arbitration study considers the relationship be-
tween arbitration and other contractual provisions. See  Christopher R. Drahozal &
Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration:  An Application to
Franchise Contracts , 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 580 (2003) (“Franchising parties who
include provisions in their contracts limiting damages—those most concerned about
the risk of excessive damages in court—are highly likely to opt for arbitration.”).
